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Appendix 
Table 1: The economic and market indicators of Ireland, Spain and Singapore 
     Capital Investment as % of GDP Economic growth: the rate of change of real 
GDP 
Years Spain Ireland Singapore  Spain Ireland Singapore 
2004 28.75 27.23 23.10  3.17 4.58 9.55 
2005 30.75 30.37 21.37  3.72 5.67 7.49 
2006 31.30 31.89 22.32  4.17 5.47 8.86 
2007 31.34 29.22 23.12  3.77 4.93 9.11 
2008 29.60 24.62 30.44  1.12 -2.61 1.79 
2009 24.57 20.31 27.67  -3.57 -6.37 -0.6 
2010 23.55 17.46 27.87  0.01 -0.28 15.24 
2011 21.11 17.65 27.26  -0.62 2.77 6.21 
2012 20.23 19.33 29.99  -2.09 -0.31 3.41 
2013 19.14 18.08 29.00  -1.23 0.17 4.44 
2014 19.78 20.32 27.64  1.39 4.79 2.92 
Source: World Bank Data 

















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Table 2: Operationalisation of determinants 
Determinants  Operationalization 
Dependent (Firm performance variable) 
   
Tobin’s Q     
 
Market capitalization divided by Total assets 
Independent 
Corporate governance variable 
Female  The proportion of female directors on the 
board. 
 
Non-Executive Directors 
(NEDs) 
 The ratio of non-executive and/or 
independent directors to total number of 
directors on the board. 
 
   
Board size  Board size is the natural logarithm of board 
size. Board size is the total number of 
directors on the board. 
 
Control variables in firm level 
   
Firm size 
 
 
Firm Age 
 
 The natural logarithm of firm size is used in 
the models. Firm size is the book value of 
total assets. 
Age of the company since incorporation  
Leverage  
 
 
Sales growth 
 
 
 
Capex Growth  
(Capital expenditure growth) 
 
 
STA (Sales to Total Assets) 
 
 
ROA 
 Leverage is the book value of long term debt 
to the book value of total assets. 
 
Sales growth is obtained by the given 
equation: (Current Period Net Sales - Prior 
Period Net Sales) / Prior Period Net Sales  
 
Capital expenditure growth suggests the 
ability of the companies to commit funds for 
long-term use. 
 
Sales to Assets ratio is expressed as Net sales 
divided by Total assets 
 
Return on Assets 
   
   

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Table 3: Summary statistics of Irish firms for 210 observations 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board Size 10.66 3.83 5.00 23.00 
NED 0.63 0.15 0.30 1.00 
Female 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.33 
Firm Age 58.69 41.41 14.00 163.00 
Leverage 23.59 19.08 0.00 114.45 
Firm Size 6.65 2.01 1.52 10.02 
Sales Growth 0.01 0.06 -0.27 0.37 
STA 1.16 0.97 0.05 10.36 
Capex Growth 5.20 64.69 -5.18 933.31 
ROA 6.07 9.73 -40.10 36.81 
TQ                                        1.19                   1.14                      0.04                   6.13 

Table 4: Summary statistics of Spanish firms for 520 observations    
 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev Min Max 
Board Size 11.57 3.47 4.00 26.00 
NED 0.79 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Female 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.50 
Firm Age 44.28 31.76 3.00 157.00 
Leverage 0.34 0.22 0.00 2.35 
Firm Size 6.94 2.05 1.68 11.94 
Sales Growth 0.01 0.06 -0.54 0.52 
STA 0.68 0.40 0.02 4.06 
Capex Growth 783.02 2163.87 0.00 24099.56 
ROA 4.29 7.19 -26.13 36.21 
TQ 0.79 0.88 0.03 5.98 







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Table 5:  Correlation matrix of Irish firms 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Correlation matrix of Spanish firms 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Size NED Female Firm Age LeverageFirm Size Sales Growth STA Capex Growth ROA TQ
Board Size 1.00
NED 0.40 1.00
Female 0.00 0.18 1.00
Firm Age 0.06 0.11 0.07 1.00
Leverage 0.30 0.03 0.15 0.14 1.00
Firm Size 0.51 0.33 0.50 0.03 0.04 1.00
Sales Growth 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.04 1.00
STA 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.26 0.01 0.00 1.00
Capex Growth 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.01 1.00
ROA 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.39 0.34 0.14 0.30 0.02 1.00
TQ 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.39 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.52 1.00
Board Size NED Female Firm Age LeverageFirm Size Sales GrowthSTA Capex GrowthROA TQ
Board Size 
NED 0.22 1.00
Female 0.02 0.16 1.00
Firm Age -0.11 -0.06 0.04 1.00
Leverage 0.27 0.04 0.07 -0.08 1.00
Firm Size 0.59 0.23 0.11 -0.17 0.12 1.00
Sales Growth 0.02 0.01 -0.18 -0.11 -0.10 0.06 1.00
STA -0.28 -0.06 0.10 0.02 -0.20 -0.18 -0.14 1.00
Capex Growth 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.54 0.00 -0.20 1.00
ROA 0.10 0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.37 0.45 0.18 0.12 0.13 1.00
TQ -0.15 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.43 0.20 0.08 0.33 -0.09 0.57 1.00
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Table 7: Regression estimations of Irish firms with TQ as dependent variables for the study 
period (2005-14) and during the global financial crisis (GFC) (2007-09) period. 
2005-14 Full Period           2007-09 GFC 
 
TQ-FE TQ-RE TQ-GLS TQ-FE TQ-RE TQ-GLS 
Board Size -0.075 -0.062 -0.046 -0.014 -0.029 -0.028 
(2.68)*** (2.42)** (1.98)** -0.7 -1.44 -0.92 
NED -0.742 -0.97 0.138 0.281 -0.041 -0.078 
-1.19 -1.7 -0.3 -0.48 -0.07 -0.13 
Female -0.327 -1.634 -2.964 -0.217 -1.967 -1.974 
-0.31 -1.8 (2.85)*** -0.21 (2.08)** -1.5 
Firm Age -0.038 -0.008 -0.007 -0.024 -0.004 -0.004 
(2.26)** -1.74 (4.63)*** -0.77 -1.09 (2.47)* 
Leverage -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.005 
(2.02)** (2.20)** -1.66 -0.14 -1.81 -1.12 
Firm Size 0.583 0.424 0.129 0.516 0.348 0.109 
(7.72)*** (6.50)*** (2.74)*** (8.33)*** (6.86)*** (2.11)* 
Sales 
Growth 1.57 1.624 0.71 -0.049 -0.082 0.054 
(2.28)** (2.31)** -0.64 -0.15 -0.24 -0.06 
STA 0.08 0.071 -0.013 -0.307 -0.372 -0.258 
-1.38 -1.22 -0.19 -1.72 (2.55)** (2.14)* 
Capex 
Growth 0 0 -0.001 -0.164 -0.152 -0.001 
-0.01 0 -0.99 (2.07)** (2.07)** 0 
ROA 0.007 0.015 0.051 0.004 0.008 0.035 
-1.05 (2.30)** (6.61)*** -1.37 (2.26)** (4.87)** 
Constant  0.894 0.256 1.247 -0.832 -0.085 1.084 
-0.82 -0.41 (3.81)*** -0.47 -0.15 (2.85)** 
R2 0.44 0.23 0.83 0.21 
N 209 209 209 63 63 63 
Note: ** indicates significance at 5% level and *** indicates significance at 1% level (t-
statistic/z-values in parentheses). FE-indicates fixed effects regression model, RE indicates 
random effects regression model and GLS is generalized least squares regression model 
estimation. 







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Table 8: Regression estimations of Spanish firms with TQ as dependent variables for the 
study period (2005-14) and during the global financial crisis (GFC) (2007-09) period. 
 
2005-14 Full Period        2007-09 GFC 
TQ-FE TQ-RE TQ-GLS TQ-FE TQ-RE TQ-GLS 
Board Size -0.057 -0.076 -0.051 0.016 -0.024 -0.033 
(3.40)*** (5.05)*** (4.80)*** -0.58 -1.24 (2.40)** 
NED 0.8 0.5 -0.005 -0.186 -0.455 -0.198 
(4.10)*** (2.55)** -0.03 -0.51 -1.68 -0.94 
Female 1.132 0.069 -0.205 1.173 0.621 -0.154 
(3.12)*** -0.21 -0.72 (1.98)** -1.29 -0.38 
Firm Age -0.039 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
(4.88)*** -1.41 (2.14)** -0.35 -0.26 -1.2 
Leverage -0.372 -0.569 -0.831 -0.106 -0.618 -1.081 
(2.78)*** (4.16)*** (5.59)*** -0.3 (2.10)** (4.02)*** 
Firm Size 0.449 0.291 0.118 0.41 0.214 0.161 
(11.59)*** (9.31)** (5.12)*** (5.68)*** (5.18)*** (4.90)*** 
Sales Growth -1.255 -0.366 -0.022 -1.112 -0.753 -0.99 
 
(3.47)*** -0.99 -0.05 (2.58)** -1.75 -1.46 
STA 0.705 0.66 0.459 0.307 0.361 0.308 
 
(8.03)*** (7.59)*** (6.07)*** (2.35)** (3.19)*** (2.77)*** 
Capex Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
-1.82 (2.53)** (3.56)*** -0.85 (2.60)*** (3.09)*** 
ROA 0.021 0.029 0.046 -0.001 -0.002 0.017 
 
(5.12)*** (6.75)*** (8.98)*** -0.23 -0.34 (2.61)*** 
Constant  -1.069 -0.959 0.482 -2.174 -0.209 0.276 
 
(2.01)** (3.04)*** (2.45)** -1.93 -0.58 -1.1 
R2 0.52 0.33 0.35 0.38 
N 520 520 520 156 156 156 
Note: ** indicates significance at 5% level and *** indicates significance at 1% level (t-
statistic/z-values in parentheses) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Table 9: Comparison of standard error estimates under three model estimations for Spanish 
and Irish firms for the period 2005-2014. 

 Spanish Firms Irish Firms 
Variables Driscoll-Kraay Newey-West OLS  Driscoll-Kraay Newey-West OLS  
      Board Size  0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 
(0.0122)** (0.0188)** (0.0212)*** (-0.007)*** (-0.0305) (0.0333)* 
NED 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.26 0.26 -0.63 
(-0.1828) (-0.2278) (-0.3071) (-0.7738) (-0.7513) 0.86 
Female -0.09 -0.09 0.11 -2.72 -2.72 -2.27 
(-0.4283) (-0.3792) (-0.4351) (0.4421)*** (1.3105)* (0.9634)* 
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(-0.0006) (-0.001) (-0.0026) (0.0015)** (0.0022)** 0.00 
Leverage -0.84 -0.84 -0.57 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.1647)*** (0.3137)** 0.46 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Firm Size 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.42 
(0.0305)* (0.04272)* (0.0524)*** (0.0169)*** 0.07 (0.1044)*** 
Sales 
Growth  -0.22 -0.22 -0.56 0.47 0.47 1.34 
(-1.1178) (-0.9591) (-0.9877) 0.76 1.20 (0.6658)* 
STA 0.49 0.49 0.67 -0.19 -0.19 0.14 
(0.0825)*** (0.1413)*** (0.1756)*** (0.0457)** 0.13 0.20 
Capex 
Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 
ROA 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 
(0.0157)* (0.0103)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0189)** (0.0082)* 
Constant 0.59 0.59 -0.96 1.40 1.40 0.05 
(0.0892)*** (0.2631)* (0.4008)* (0.4078)** (0.5794)* 0.81 
R
2
 0.45 0.33 0.42 0.24 
N 468.00 468.00 468.00 189.00 189.00 189.00 
 
Note: The dependent variable in the regression is the Tobin’q and , , and  imply 
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

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Relevance of corporate boards in driving performance in the period that covers 
financial crisis 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose of the study:  This study examines the relevance of boards in driving firm level 
performance. For this purpose, it considers firms listed on Ireland and Spain stock exchanges 
for the period 2005 to 2014, over a period that includes the global financial crisis. 
Design/methodology/approach: This study uses panel data regression analysis to analyse 
the effects of board characteristics on performance and also uses alternate model 
specifications to test the significance of robustness of relationships.  
Findings: The impact of board size on performance is negative and significant for Irish and 
Spanish firms for the study period. In general, the board independence has a positive effect 
on the performance of Spanish firms for the complete study period and suggests consistency 
with the resource dependency theory.  
Research implications: The analysis suggests that in general the non-executive and the 
board size do not affect the corporate performance of Irish and Spanish firms during the 
financial crisis. The fixed effects model suggests positive effects of gender diversity on 
performance for Spanish firms while, the random effects indicates negative relationship 
between gender diversity and performance for Irish companies. 
Practical Implications: The evidence on the Spanish firms suggests that female 
representation on the boards may be critical during the financial crisis 
Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature on the corporate governance 
practices and performance of two countries that were strongly affected by the crisis in the 
European Union. As governments increasingly contemplate board gender diversity policies, 
our study offers useful empirical insights on Spanish and Irish firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study empirically examines the relationship between board characteristics and firm level 
performance of companies listed on the Ireland and Spain stock exchanges for the period 
2005 to 2014. The study of these two countries provides a context to understand the role of 
boards in affecting the performance in a period that also includes the great financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2008. Therefore, this study is important for two reasons. Firstly, the opening decade 
of the 21st century was characterized by successive shocks, feedback effects between the 
financial and productive sectors, a rapid deterioration in many countries’ fiscal position, 
difficulties in creating jobs during the recovery and, lastly, the worsening euro area sovereign 
debt crisis (Estrade et al., 2009 and European Commission, 2012). The events of this period 
provides a significant challenge to boards and directors. 
Three corporate governance indicators (board size, female representation and board 
independence) were chosen in testing the hypothesized relationship between corporate 
governance practices with firm performance, which was measured by Tobin’s Q. Descriptive 
and correlation analysis were used to examine the hypotheses in this study. The result showed 
that board size had a significantly negative relationship with Tobin’s Q for the firms of the 
two countries.    The impact of board size on performance is negative and significant for Irish 
firms and Spanish firms for the study period. Board independence had a positive effect on 
Spanish firms for the complete study period and also during the financial crisis period and 
suggests consistency with the resource dependency theory. Female representation is negative 
and a significant driver of performance for Irish firms only.  
Corporate governance has strong links to both economic and social outcomes. Corporate 
governance codes play an increasingly important role in addressing gender balance on 
corporate boards. To illustrate, Spain adopted a law on effective equality between women and 
men in 2007, which recommends to large companies that, within eight years, the board 
composition of their board proportion should be between 40% and 60% female (Rodriguez–
Fernández et al., 2014). While for Ireland, no quota law or proposal is underway on gender 
diversity. Their approach is considered as soft law as it relies on the principle of comply or 
explain. The impact of the two codes - quota law as in Spain or soft law as in Ireland is 
unclear from the literature.  
 
The board of directors is one governance mechanism that a firm may use to mitigate agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership from control. Despite being the subject of 
much attention from regulators and the combined code, boards display considerable cross 
sectional variation. Agency theory suggests that management will act in their own interest if 
they have the latitude to do so. Any power conveyed by ownership will be exploited by 
management to construct a board that does not monitor them. Zajac and Westphal (1996) 
drawing on organization behaviour and organizational sociology as well as financial agency 
theory explain why both passive boards and controlling boards exist. For example, a passive 
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CEO dominated board will recruit non-executive directors (NEDs) that have served on other 
passive boards.  
Governance practice occurs in specific economic, social and legal contexts. These vary 
significantly between Ireland and Spain. The Irish Stock Exchange requires that companies 
make a disclosure statement in their annual report with respect to their corporate governance 
practices which (a) explains how they apply the principles of the code and (b) states whether 
they comply with the code and if the latter is the case explain the reasons for non-compliance. 
However, mere compliance with the letter of the Combined Code does not ensure that a 
company is well-governed as the board is only one part of the overall corporate governance 
architecture of a company. Other aspects of a company’s governance structure include its 
ownership structure, its level of debt and the market for corporate control. It has been 
suggested (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Rediker and Seth, 1995) that all of these governance 
mechanisms are in fact substitutes for each other. Further, companies’ adoption of corporate 
governance best practice alone will not guarantee progress. Many other factors dictate the 
success of firms, among ther things, key issue is effective and competent supervision to 
ensure proper compliance (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012). 
Considering the Spanish and Irish environment allows us to expand previous results typical 
of the Anglo-Saxon corporate system to different settings. In Spain and Ireland, the legal 
protection of shareholders is not as extensive as that found in Anglo-American markets and 
Spanish and Irish stock markets are less developed and play a far lesser role than British or 
American markets do (Fernández-Méndez and Arrondo-García 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008). Furthermore, Spanish data is interesting because boards are dominated by executive 
directors (Olivencia 1998; Heidrick and Struggles 2003), and as a result, they are able to 
pursue their own interests by limiting the effectiveness of monitoring resources (Ruiz-
Barbadillo et al., 2007). From the legal origin point of view, Irish corporate governance codes 
originate from common law jurisdiction while Spain belongs to civil law jurisdiction. 
Although gender equality became a priority on the governmental agenda especially in the 
years preceding the economic crisis from 2004 to 2010, the Spain’s gender equality policies 
and institutions between 2009 and 2016 have been progressively dismantled and are currently 
endangered by the austerity policies adopted in Spain in response to the 2008 economic crisis. 
In this context of backlash, the future of gender equality policies in Spain looks extremely 
uncertain (Lombardo, 2016). Further, the absence of sanctions for noncompliant companies 
weakened the effectiveness of the statutory policy. The law only established incentives, such 
as a governmental ‘equality award’ for companies that stand out in the promotion of equality 
and a priority for such companies in contracts with the government. Yet, compared to 
nullifying boards’ decisions, as it is done in Belgium, or suspension of board members’ 
compensation or dissolution of the board, as in Norway, enjoying a lower preference in the 
granting of government contracts is a weak sanction for incompliant companies (Piscopo and 
Clark Muntean 2013). 
Do these and other cross-country differences in corporate governance features lead to 
significant differences in performances of firms in these countries? This study expands the 
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literature by examining the effects of corporate governance on performance during the crisis 
period (2007-2009) and also the period as a whole that covers the pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis (2004-2014). The study uses regression models involving panel data analysis and 
Tobin’s Q as a performance proxy.  
 
The study explores two main questions:  
 
(1) What relationship exists between the board characteristics and firm level performance 
with a special reference to the financial crisis?  
 
(2) Are the experiences of the two countries comparable?  
 
 
1.1 Why Spain and Ireland? 
 
Spain and Ireland are among those countries that were most affected by the European crisis in 
2008. The severity of economic crisis that has plagued Spain and Ireland since 2008 is an 
important incentive to work on this subject in order to contribute research insights on the 
effects of corporate governance on performance of the company, the investors and the 
government (Rodriguez–Fernández et al., 2014). Further, these types of studies may also 
have a predictive value, as indicated by some authors (Conyon et al., 2011), to highlight the 
usefulness of research in this field to ameliorate future financial crises. 
 
Until 2007, the Spanish economy outperformed most other European countries. However, 
these settings lead to some adverse adjustments for the Spanish economy where the low and 
stable interest rate allowed a rapid growth in corporate and household credit and debt 
(Estrada, Jimeno and Malo de Molina, 2009) and the real exchange rate to appreciate. As for 
Ireland, it had strong economic growth in the early 1990s. With the increased domestic 
demand, Ireland had a severe economic expansion. Ireland faced two big problems, a sharp 
decline in cyclical construction-related revenues and the sudden appearance of very large 
losses in the domestic banking system (European Commission, 2011).  
 
Given, both Spain and Ireland experienced economic shocks as shown in Table 1 it is 
important to shed some light on how effective boards were in driving firm performance 
during this period. Table 1 also includes Singapore to enable comparison between a country 
that has been resilient to economic crisis with those of distressed countries: Ireland and Spain. 
 
  Table 1: The economic and market indicators of Ireland, Spain and Singapore 
Page 11 of 27 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance


Although the global economy is more integrated, there is no specifically determined or best 
corporate governance structure for each company because of the different cultures, polities 
and societies in different countries (Dian, 2014).  In this case, it is useful to undertake a cross-
country comparison and provide insights into the role of corporate governance in affecting 
performance during the financial crisis and over a period that covers crisis for the two 
countries. Moreover, the study of two countries is important because it provides us a context 
to examine the significant role of the corporate governance and boards in steering the 
companies towards performance in the decade in which the world economy has undergone a 
phase of marked instability and has been characterized by successive shocks.  
We have several principal findings. First, the cross-country comparison of the corporate 
governance characteristics like board size, female representation, and non-executive directors   
 are similar for the two countries as shown in the descriptive statistics. Second, inspite of the 
common features regarding female representation and non-executive directors, there is a 
significant variation in the cross-country relationships with corporate performance. The 
female representation has positive and significant effects on performance for Spanish firms. 
However they are negative and significant for Irish firms. Likewise, the non-executive 
directors of Spanish firms affect performance significantly and positively, while in the case of 
Irish companies they are insignificant.  Third, the experiences of the board size affecting the 
performance in the two countries are comparable. While one characteristic has a positive 
relationship with performance in one country it has negative or no relationship in another 
country. Fourth, these findings are relevant for the literature on governance for at least two 
reasons: i), findings in a specific country cannot be generalized to other countries and ii) a set 
of variables that is used to study a specific country is most likely not the complete set of 
variables in another country. 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review 
and hypotheses development; Section 3 presents the methodology and data analysis; Section 
4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
2. Literature Review  
 
The two main theories considered in this study are agency theory and resource dependency 
theory.  These theories provide fundamental explanations to many of the findings in this 
study. Agency theory assumes that principals and agents have divergent interests and that 
agents are essentially self-serving and self-centred (Berle & Means, 1932). It concerns itself 
with the conflict of interests between principals and agents and therefore focuses on the 
monitoring and control function of the board. Agency theory as posited by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) assumes that agency problems can be resolved with appropriately designed 
contracts by specifying the rights belonging to agents and principals. Fama and Jensen (1983, 
p. 302) refer to such contracts as “internal rules of the game which specify the rights of each 
agent in the organisation, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated and the payoff 
functions they face.” However, unforeseen events or circumstances require allocation of 
residual rights, most of which end up with the agents (managers), giving them discretion to 
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allocate funds as they choose (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The inability or difficulty in writing 
perfect contracts, therefore, leads to increased managerial discretion which encapsulates the 
same agency problem. The managers who possess superior knowledge and expertise about 
the firm are in a position to pursue self-interests rather than shareholders (owners) interests 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). This pursuit of self-interests increases the costs to the 
firm, which may include the costs of structuring the contracts, costs of monitoring and 
controlling the behaviour of the agents, and loss incurred due to sub-optimal decisions being 
taken by the agents. 
 
The resource dependence theory takes a positive view and underscores the importance of 
board as a resource in helping the firm secure access to diverse resources in which the boards 
can add value t  the firm’s performance by using their networks and outside connections 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, this perspective views governance structure and 
the board composition as a resource that can add value to the firm (Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001). A key argument of the resource dependence theory is that organisations attempt to 
exert control over their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, boards are considered as a link between the firm and the 
essential resources that a firm needs from the external environment for superior performance. 
Appointment of outsiders on the board helps in gaining access to resources critical to firm 
success (Johnson et al., 1996, p. 410). In the resource dependence role, outside directors 
“bring resources to the firm, such as information, skills, access to key constituents (e.g., 
suppliers, buyers, public policy decision makers, social groups) and legitimacy” (Hillman et 
al., 2000, p. 238). 
 
The two most important functions of the board of directors are those of advising and 
monitoring (Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferriera, 2009). The advisory function involves the 
provision of expert advice to the CEO and access to critical information and resources (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). This is performed by both insiders and outsiders, although Fama and 
Jensen (1983) note the importance of outside directors, who bring valuable expertise and 
potentially important connections. Raheja (2005) argues that insiders are an important source 
of firm-specific information for the board, but may have distorted objectives due to private 
benefits and lack of independence from the CEO. Compared to insiders, outsiders are more 
independent, providing better monitoring, but are less informed about the firm’s activities.  
The board is presumed to be more independent as the number of outside directors increases 
proportionately. According to Cadbury (1992) the non-executive directors are responsible for 
reviewing the performance of both the board and executive directors. Their positions are 
usually part time, they often sit on many boards, and they are typically paid less than 
executive directors are (Davies, 2002). Although the use of independent directors has become 
increasingly accepted, especially in Anglo-American countries where the stock market 
performance of listed companies attracts a great deal of interest from the public, some 
scholars question its rationale (e.g., Bhagat and Black 2002; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). 
These critics argue that monitoring by independent directors can be ineffective.  
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On the other hand, a positive relationship between board independence and firm value is 
predicted by both Agency Theory and Resource Dependent Theory and empirically, there are 
studies that document these views (Lei and Song, 2012; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010) 
and show a significant linkage between the higher level of board independence and firm 
valuation. Further, from Irish companies perspective, Donnelly and Kelly (2005) found that 
the board structure is primarily determined as the result of a bargaining process between the 
management and outside shareholders.  
Board independence is often defined as the percentage of non-executive directors and/or 
independent directors on the board. Despite all the value placed on the independent director 
by financial market participants and regulators, empirical evidence on the relationships 
between board independence and firm performance is largely inconclusive (Bozec, 2013).  
 
Similarly, non-executive directors are believed to be more vigilant monitors of firm 
management, but Williamson (2007) contends that non-executive directors have an 
information disadvantage compared with insiders and are typically slow to react in situations 
of adversity. Williamson warns that boards comprising a high ratio of non-executive directors 
typically “failed to act promptly and with urgency when a crisis occurs” (2007:262). 
Accordingly, following Essen et al. (2013) this study reasons that while good governance 
board characteristics associated with vigilant oversight may represent best practice in stable 
state conditions, these same characteristics can inhibit managerial discretion and limit their 
capacity to respond to the contingencies of a financial crisis with negative effects for a firm’s 
financial performance. On the basis of the literature review our study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board and corporate performance, while a high fraction of independent directors, will 
have a more negative/positive impact on a firm’s financial performance during financial 
crisis.  
 
 
As pointed out by Guest (2009) for large boards, coordination and communication problems 
arise because it is more difficult to arrange board meetings, reach consensus, leading to 
slower and less-efficient decision making (Jensen, 1993). Secondly, board cohesiveness is 
undermined because board members will be less likely to communicate clearly with each 
other and reach a consensus (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
Evidence from other countries is broadly consistent but less robust. For Switzerland, Loderer 
and Peyer (2002) find a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q (although not on 
profitability), whereas Beiner et al. (2004, 2006) find no negative impact. For Malaysian 
firms, both Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a significantly 
negative impact of board size on Tobin’s Q, while Bozec (2005) finds that board size has a 
significantly negative effect on sales margin but not profitability for 25 large Canadian firms. 
For the UK, Conyon and Peck (1998) examine 481 listed UK firms for 1992–1995 and find a 
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significantly negative effect of board size on both markets to book value and profitability, 
whereas Lasfer (2004) finds a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q. The evidence 
presents mixed results on the relationship between board size and corporate performance. 
Therefore, our study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship could be either positive/negative between the board size and 
corporate performance 
 
The presence of gender diversity on boards is assumed to produce significant positive 
consequences for board effectiveness (Adams, de Haan, Terjesen, and van Ees, 2015). For 
example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that boards with a balanced gender representation 
can allocate more time to board monitoring, so supporting the idea that a more diverse board 
may be more independent from top managers. The empirical evidence linking gender 
diversity to firm financial performance is more equivocal (Kumar and Zattoni, 2016). With 
regard to the relationship between the introduction of quota law and firm performance, 
Ferreira (2015) argues that previous studies are affected by too many methodological 
problems to produce conclusive results. More recently, however, combining the results of 
140 studies in a meta-analysis, Post and Byron (2015) show that women on boards tend to 
positively affect accounting returns, but do not have a large influence on market performance. 
The evidence presents mixed views on the relationship between gender diversity and 
corporate performance. Therefore, our study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship could be either positive/negative between the gender 
diversity and corporate performance 
3. Data Source and Methodology 
 
This study investigates corporate governance-firm financial performance relationship of 21 
companies listed on Ireland stock exchange Index, ISEQ20 and 52 in Spain stock index, 
IBEX35 for the period 2005 to 2014.  The firm-year observations that do not have three-year 
continuous data are eliminated to reduce error. The final panel data is strongly balanced for 
the two countries. Company performance data and other accounting data for explanatory 
variables were downloaded from Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database). Data on 
board structure determinants were hand collected from annual reports of each observed 
company and all the annual reports were downloaded from companies’ official website. Table 
2 below describes the dependent and independent variables used in the study.  
The initial number of Spanish companies collected from Thomson One Banker was 133 
making it 1330 firm-year observations for the ten years’ period. Following the literature, our 
study focuses only on non-financial firms as corporate governance aspects and financial 
structure of banks and financial firms are different than those of non-financial firms (Adams 
& Mehran, 2003, Bauer, Frijns, Otten & Tourani-Rad, 2008 and Gupta, Krishnamurti, & 
Tourani-Rad, 2013). Consequently, it excluded 69 financial companies, as they have different 
marketing system and regulatory factors concerning corporate governance. Out of the 
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remaining sample, the study verified the data availability and continuity. Those companies 
whose data was not available continuously for three year periods were excluded and finally, 
the study was left with 52 Spanish firms. A similar, approach was applied to Irish firms in 
choosing and finalising the sample. Out of 47 Irish firms that were initially considered, 21 
Irish companies with 210 firm-year observations are finally included in the study. Therefore, 
the final sample includes 520 observations for Spain and 210 for Ireland. The critical issue, 
both theoretically and empirically, is what determines the inclusion of countries in the 
selected sample used in the regression equation. If cross-country data were available 
randomly, the selectivity bias would not be a problem. If, on the other hand, the availability 
of required data were not randomly determined, then selection bias could be a significant 
issue (Jayant &  Rivera, 2002). It is evident from the sample selection procedure undertaken 
in the study, that it is very unlikely that our analysis suffer from sample selection bias. 
 
 
The corporate governance variables include: board size, composition, female representation 
(gender diversity) and characteristics of the firms are captured by efficiency ratios (sales to 
total assets, leverage (debt to total assets), firm size and firm age). The financial performance 
is measured by Tobin Q, which is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value 
of debt all divided by the book value of total assets (i.e. a numerical variable). It is considered 
as the dependent variable in the regression estimations.  
Given the differences in size, conduct and corporate structure between the financial and non-
financial firms, the present study considers the non-financial firms (see, e.g., Schultz, Tan, 
and Walsh, 2010; Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy, 2014).  Firms, whose outside directors 
effectively monitor the performance of management, should have higher level of sales, than 
comparable firms whose management is less well disciplined (John and Senbet, 1998). Hence, 
the present study also considers the price to sales to asset ratio as one of the control variables. 
Empirical Specification and estimation strategy 
 
To address the concern that corporate governance variables and profitability are jointly 
determined by unobservable firm specific variables, the study employs a fixed-effects model, 
which represents a common method of controlling for omitted variables in a panel data set 
(see e.g., Yermack, 1996; Wintoki, 2012). In order to consider the effects of corporate 
governance on performance of Spanish and Irish listed companies, a basic specification with 
controlling firm characteristics is expressed as below.  
                                            
)1(23110 itititit uXXY +++= ϕϕϕ  
where dependent variables (Yit), includes: the Tobin’s Q in equation (2) below.  The, X1it  is a 
vector of independent variables as listed and described in the Table 2. The baseline model in 
this study is as follows: 
 
Page 16 of 27Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance


  		 				 	 	  	
	 !" 	#	 	$%	&'(  )%
	*+,-	.&'(  / 01  2 	3 3 3 456 
Using STATA 14 version, the study employs different regression techniques that includes  
fixed effects model and random effects model, and the generalised least square model (GLS). 
The models were chosen based on findings of diagnostics tests that includes: Hausman tests 
(to decide between the fixed and random effects), Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests 
(choosing between OLS and Random effects model).  
Following the post estimation tests for autocorrelation (Wooldridge test in panel data, 
Durbin-Watson and Durbin alternate tests reject the null and suggests issues pertaining to 
autocorrelation) and heteroscedasticity (the modified Wald test for group wise 
heteroskedasticity), this study uses robust standard errors that ensures valid statistical 
inference when some regression model’s assumptions are violated as developed by Huber 
(1967), Eicker (1967), and White (1980).  If the residuals are independently distributed, 
standard errors, which are obtained by aid of this estimator, are consistent even if the 
residuals are heteroscedastic. In Stata, heteroscedasticity consistent or “White” standard 
errors are obtained by choosing option vce (robust) which is available for most estimation 
commands. 
The study also uses the Newey and West (1987) approach to obtain heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. In Stata, Newey-West standard errors for panel 
datasets are obtained by choosing option force of the Newey command. The study also 
implements nonparametric corrections for the cross-sectional dependence as proposed by 
Driscoll and Kraay’s that applies a Newey-West type correction to the sequence of cross-
sectional averages of the moment conditions. Adjusting the standard error estimates in this 
way guarantees that the covariance matrix estimator is consistent, independently of the cross-
sectional dimension N (i.e. also for N  ).  
 
Controls for Endogenity: Endogeneity is an issue in governance studies that makes 
interpretation of the results difficult. As pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), the 
relation between board characteristics and firm performance may be spurious because a 
company's governance structure and performance are endogenously determined. This issue is 
less likely to be problematic in our setting because the financial crisis is largely an exogenous 
macroeconomic shock.  The study, however, employs an instrumental variable approach to 
check for endogeneity and the tests results suggest that the endogeneity is not an issue. 
Therefore, the study uses panel data analysis, and the Hausman test results support fixed 
effect model as appropriate over random effects model.  
 
Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) suggest that by looking only at within-firm changes, 
firm fixed effects regression is an effective method of solving the potential endogeneity 
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problems in board structure research. To control for possible unobserved firm characteristics, 
we estimate our main specification by using firm-level fixed effects. To address the potential 
issue of omitted variables, our study will carry out a panel data analysis and introduce 
selected control variables that might affect performance but would not be affected by it.  The 
control variables include leverage, firm size, sales growth, sales to asset ratio (STA), growth 
in capital expenditure and return on total asset (ROA).  
 
Table 2: Operationalisation of determinants 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
It is evident from Table 3, that the boards in Ireland are mostly independent. The 
representation of the independent or non-executive directors is 6 for a board size of 10.66 
(0.63 x 10.66), while the female board members are 0.85 for a board size of 10.66 (0.08 x 
10.66).  
Table 3: Summary statistics of Irish Firms for 210 observations  
In the case of Spain, Table 4 shows that the representation of the non-executive directors 
mean size is 9 (0.79 x 11.57) and the mean of female board members is 0.94 for a board size 
of 11.57 (0.08 x 11.57).  
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of Spanish firms for 520 observations 
 
 4.2 Correlation matrix 
Tables 5 and 6 show correlation matrix for the Irish and Spanish samples respectively. It is 
evident from the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 that correlations between the explanatory 
and dependent variables are not an issue. There is no indication of multi-collinearity between 
the variables and none of them are close to a 0.90 limit. It is mentioned in the literature that 
when correlations between two variables exceed 0.80 or 0.90 multicolinearity is considered 
as a problem for the model (Judge et al., 1985). As there is no multicolinearity problem 
between independent variables, therefore, the multiple regression model can be utilized with 
these variables. 
 
Table 5 Correlation matrix of Irish firms 
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Table 6:  Correlation matrix of Spanish firms 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 

It is evident from Table 7 that, in the case of Irish firms, the board size affects significantly 
and negatively for the study period 2005-14 and is less relevant during the financial crisis 
period. While, the non-executive directors are not significant drivers of the performance 
under both the periods. However, the female representation has significant and negative 
effect at 1% level during the study period under generalised least square estimation and at 5% 
level during the financial crisis period. The firm size and return on assets has positive and 
significant effects on the performance, mostly, at 1% level. This suggests that as the size of firm 
increases, performance is likely to move upward. While the sales growth affects performance 
significantly for the complete sample period. 
Table 7: Regression estimations of Irish Firms with Tobin’s Q as dependent variables  
It is evident from Table 8 that, in the case of Spanish firms, the board size affects 
performance negatively and significantly at 1% level for the study period 2005-14 and has 
minimum effects on performance during the financial crisis period. While, the influence of 
the non-executive directors is positive and significant at 1% (5%) levels for the complete 
study period and has little effect during the financial crisis period. Further, the female 
representation affects performance positively and significantly at 1% level for the study 
period 2005-14 and significant and positive at 5% level during the financial crisis period 
under fixed effects specification. The firm size, ROA, Capex growth and sales to asset ratio 
are positive and mostly significant at 1% level for the study period and also during the 
financial crisis period.  The effects of women corporate engagement in board decision 
making would have been more evident if the implementation of legal instruments to enforce 
gender quotas were initiated as indicated by Armstrong and Walby, (2012).  
Table 8: Regression estimations of Spanish Firms with Tobin’s Q as dependent variables 
Table 9 provides the coefficient estimates from the regression model in estimated by pooled 
OLS (vce, robust), the standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained from the covariance 
matrix estimators in the column headings. The association between the board size and 
performance is robust and significant for the two countries and corroborates with the results 
presented in Tables 7 and 8. The female board representation is significant and negative in 
the case of Irish firms and not significant for Spanish firms. 
Table 9: Comparison of standard error estimates under three model estimations for Spanish 
and Irish firms for the period 2005-2014. 
It is therefore, evident from the above that the results of Spanish and Irish firms supports the 
rejection of the null hypothesis and suggests a negative and significant relationship between 
the board size and performance for the study period. However, the results on board size do 
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not support the rejection of the null for the firms in both countries during the financial crisis 
period. In the case of female representation, the results for the Spanish firms favour the 
rejection of the null hypothesis for the study period at 1% level and during the crisis period at 
10% level. However, the results on female board representation suggest rejection of the null 
at 5% level in the case of the Irish firms for the study period and also during the financial 
crisis period. While, in the case the Spanish firms, the non-executive directors shows a 
positive and significant relationship with the performance and support the rejection of the 
null hypothesis at 1% level for the study period and also during the crisis period at 1% level. 
While the results do not support the rejection of the null hypothesis in the case of Irish firms. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This research considers two theories: resource dependency theory and agency theory, to 
explain the linkages between the board characteristics (female representation, non-executive 
directors, and board size) and firm performance. The resource dependence theory suggests 
that companies accrue benefits through boards via three channels: advice and counsel, 
legitimacy, and access to resources/channels of communication (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
The average size of the boards for the firms in the two countries is eleven.  
We find no evidence on the board size in the Spain and Ireland leading to a more positive 
firm performance. In contrast, we find a negative relation between the board size and 
performance. Overall, our evidence supports the argument that problems of poor 
communication and decision-making undermine the effectiveness of boards. Further, the role 
of boards is not significant during the financial crisis period. The experiences of the firms in 
the two countries are comparable and are consistent with the proposition of the resource 
dependency and agency views, and they are in line with Kiel and Nicholson (2003).  The 
results for Spanish firms do not confirm the findings of Essen et al. (2013) who reason that 
good governance board may represent best practice in stable state conditions but inhibit 
managerial discretion and limit their capacity to respond to the contingencies of a financial 
crisis. 
 
Although the boards are characterised as independent with non-executive directors 
comprising above 60% as shown in descriptive statistics for Irish firms and nearly 80% of 
Spanish firms, yet the experiences on the linkages between the non-executive directors and 
performance of the two countries differ.  
The non-executive directors of Spanish firms affect performance positively and significantly 
at 1% level. The evidence is robust across all the three model estimations used in the study. 
Further, even during the financial crisis period the association between non-executive 
directors and performance is positive and significant. The Spanish experience suggests that 
the non-executive directors are adding value to the firm’s performance through their networks 
and external connections during the financial crisis period and also for the period that covers 
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pre, during and post financial crisis. These results are in line with the agency and resource 
dependency theories. 
While, the association between non-executive directors and performance of Irish firms is not 
significant. The non-executive directors are not driving the performance. This corroborates 
the views of Williamson (2007) who contends that non-executive directors have an 
information disadvantage compared with insiders and are typically slow to react in situations 
of adversity.  From the results, we can infer that the independent boards might be either less 
informed or not consistent with the resource dependency view. 
Although the descriptive statistics shows that the corporates of the two countries average one 
woman on each board they differ in the way they affect the performance. The results suggest 
that the female representation has significant effects on performance for the Spanish firms for 
the study period as well as during the financial crisis period.  These findings corroborates 
with the view that one potential determinant of a boards’ effectiveness is its gender diversity, 
as the gender mix of a team may offer an assortment of knowledge and skills.  
While, in the case of Irish companies, the results are significant and negative. This 
phenomenon is consistent with critical mass theory, according to which, women and others 
different from the dominant group are likely to face tokenism when they are the sole 
representative of their group characteristic (Kanter, 1977). Consequently, the dominant group 
may tend to see women first as a female, embodying the sex role stereotype, and only later as 
individuals. The real change occurs when there are three or more women on the board (Erkut 
et al., 2008).   
The control variables firm size and sales to total assets (STA) has a positive effect on 
performance for the Spanish companies during the sample period and also for the financial 
crisis period. In the case of Irish firms, the results on the association between performance 
and firm size is comparable to the Spanish firms, but differs in the case of STA, wherein the 
association with the performance is not robust and significantly established. While the panel 
regression results indicate that leverage has a negative effect on performance across all the 
three estimation models for Spanish firms. This trend continues to document the similar 
results during the global financial crisis period. 
Although the strategy of gender mainstreaming is backed in Spain through a legal mandate at 
both the central and the regional levels, gender has not been mainstreamed into policy 
reforms adopted in response to the economic crisis. In 2015, women only represented 17 per 
cent of corporate members of the publicly listed companies, below the EU-28 average of 21 
per cent.  Although, the two countries have contrasting approaches towards ensuring gender 
balance. The Spanish firms have quota law while Irish companies have soft laws. The 3/2007 
Equality law gave Spanish public companies and listed firms eight years, that is until 2015, to 
achieve a a representation in their boards of a minimum of 40 per cent and a maximum of 60 
per cent of each sex. However, the absence of sanctions for noncompliant companies 
weakened the effectiveness of the statutory policy. The 3/2007 law only established 
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incentives, such as a governmental ‘equality award’ for companies that stand out in the 
promotion of equality and a priority for such companies in contracts with the government. 
 Nonetheless, there is, a potential to empower boards in the two countries through gender 
diversity initiatives. It can be concluded that in general, there is a significant difference 
between the Irish and Spanish board characteristics in influencing performance. The results 
are robust even after nonparametric corrections for the cross-sectional dependence as 
proposed by Driscoll and Kraay’s are applied.  
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